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They Can’t Have My Embryo: The Ethics of Conditional Embryo Donation 
 
Lucy Frith and Eric Blyth 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
There are substantial numbers of frozen embryos in storage that will not be used by those who 
produced them for their own fertility treatment. One option for such embryos is to donate them to 
others to use in their fertility treatment. There has been considerable debate about how this process 
should be organized. In the US, there are embryo adoption programmes that mediate between those 
relinquishing embryos and potential recipients. This is a form of conditional embryo donation, where 
the relinquishing couple can choose the recipient of their embryo. This article examines the ethical 
debate over conditional embryo donation for family building and explores the question of whether 
those who have unused frozen embryos should be able to determine who receives their embryos. The 
main objections to conditional embryo donation are examined: first, the embryo is not a person and 
therefore such concern over the placement of an embryo is unwarranted; secondly, potential donors 
might impose morally problematic conditions on who should receive their embryo; and thirdly, there 
are practical difficulties regarding organizational arrangements and the associated costs involved. It 
will be concluded that these objections can be countered and that if people wish to donate and receive 
embryos in this way there is no ethical objection to them doing so. 
 
Keywords: embryo donation, embryo adoption, unused embryos, conditional donation, family-
building, moral status of the embryo, embryo, infertility treatment 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been a debate about how the donation of frozen embryos to third parties who wish to use 
them to conceive a child should be carried out. In the US, there are embryo adoption programmes that 
mediate between those relinquishing embryos and potential recipients. 
This is a form of conditional embryo donation, where the relinquishing couple can choose the 
recipient of their embryo, based on various factors (such as a family report, social worker reports and 
police checks etc). Guidelines on donation of embryos for family-building in New Zealand also 
incorporate conditional donation procedures. These provide for those relinquishing embryos to be 
involved in choosing recipients. This article examines the ethical debate over conditional embryo 
donation for family-building and explores the question of whether those who have unused frozen 
embryos should be able to choose, that is impose conditions on, to whom they relinquish. 
 
This article considers the main objections to conditional embryo donation: first, the embryo is not a 
person and therefore such concern over the placement of an embryo is unwarranted; secondly, 
potential donors might impose morally problematic conditions on prospective recipients of their 
embryo; and thirdly, there are practical difficulties regarding organizational arrangements and the 
associated costs involved. The arguments against conditional embryo donation can be countered: such 
a programme does not have to be premised on the embryo having any moral status, but on future 
interests it might have when it becomes a person, and the interests of those donating; issues of morally 
problematic conditions could be addressed; and the practical difficulties can be surmounted. It will be 
argued that if people wish to donate and receive embryos in this way there is no ethical objection to 
their doing so. We will confine our discussions to embryos and not consider whether conditional 
procedures should apply to gametes, as it can be argued that embryos are different from gametes in 
certain key respects,1 and there is not space to examine these issues in this paper. 
 
BACKGROUND 
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As a result of recent developments in reproductive technology, women undergoing IVF are likely to 
produce more oocytes than can be used in a single treatment cycle. One option is to have them 
fertilised and the resulting embryos cryopreserved. Subject to legal and regulatory provisions in 
different jurisdictions, four options may be available to those with unused cryopreserved embryos at 
the end of their treatment: leaving them in storage; destroying them; donating them to research; or 
transferring them to one or more couples or individuals for family-building. The number of stored 
embryos has been rising due to the combined impact of improvements in technology and restrictions 
on the number of embryos that may be transferred in a single cycle of treatment.2 While there are no 
current statistics on the number of ‘surplus’ embryos in storage worldwide, almost a decade ago there 
were estimated to be roughly 400,000 embryos stored in the United States, approximately 47,000 of 
which (12%) will not be used by the couples who placed them in storage.3 The precise numbers of 
frozen embryos cannot be determined in the United Kingdom because of the way data are reported, 
but on average 45,000 embryos are frozen and stored each year.4 
 
Embryo donation for family-building was first reported in 1983.5 However, such practices are 
expressly forbidden in many jurisdictions,6 and where they are permitted, the prevalence is not easy to 
ascertain. In the US, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),7 in 2007 
67% of the 430 fertility clinics reporting treatment outcomes offered donor embryo services. 
However, the CDC data give no information about the services actually provided. In 2004, 
Gurmankin et al.8 reported that 76% of the clinics responding to their survey offered donor embryo 
services but, as with the CDC data, did not indicate the prevalence of the services actually provided. 
Two studies show differences between the number of clinics offering embryo donation services and 
those providing them in practice. Kingsberg et al.9 reported that only 37% of clinics had provided 
embryo donation, while Hurwitz, et al.10 reported that 60% had done so. A study by Hammond et al.11 
reported on an opportunistic poll of fertility clinics’ representatives attending a symposium on third 
party assisted reproduction, of whom 41% claimed to currently offer a programme and another 20% 
were considering doing so. In the UK between 1992–2009, 1,218 children were born from embryo 
donation. In 2010, 269 patients were treated using donor embryos (the highest number since 1992). 
This, however, remains a small part of donor treatment, with 1,380 being treated with donor eggs and 
2,960 patients using donor sperm.12 
 
What is conditional donation? 
 
For the purposes of this article we will use the term ‘conditional’ donation to mean those who have 
frozen embryos ‘specifically selecting’ to whom they will donate their embryo. This is as opposed to 
putting ‘blanket conditions’ on who should receive their embryo (i.e. not wanting to donate to single 
woman). The HFEA, in the most recent Code of Practice, stipulates that gamete and embryo donors 
can ‘specify extra conditions for storing or using their gametes (or embryos created using them)’,13 
thus allowing such ‘blanket conditions’.14 In the broad sense there is no ‘unconditional’ embryo 
donation in the UK since any recipient of a donated embryo (or gamete) would be chosen by careful 
vetting on behalf of the clinic and according to welfare of the child principles.15 The debate 
considered in this article is whether to allow embryo donors to ‘specifically select’ who should 
receive their embryo on the basis of reviewing the characteristics of the recipient. 
 
There are various ways of organizing embryo donation, which can incorporate different levels of 
involvement of those who are donating the embryo and different levels of openness and information 
sharing between the donor and the recipients. For clarity we shall divide the options into possible 
models of conditional embryo donation (these models are not exhaustive but cover the main ways of 
organizing this practice). 
 
1. A non-specific selecting, anonymous model. The embryo donors would play no part in any 
decision regarding the selection of recipients of their embryos.16 The clinic would select who 
received the embryo. Those receiving the embryo(s) could get some information about the 
donors, but this (as is often the case in gamete donation) is generally limited to physical 
characteristics and health status of the donor.17 The donation would be anonymous and there 
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would be no formal arrangements enabling any resulting child to find out the identity of their 
donors. 
2. A non-specific selecting, non-anonymous model. As Model 1, but when the resulting child 
reached majority or a specified age, they would be able to access identifying information 
about their embryo donor (such as the non-anonymous model as exists in the UK). 
3. A specific selecting, non-anonymous model.18 Here the donors would select who received 
their embryo and any resulting child would be able to have access to identifying information 
about their donor. In some examples of this (i.e. New Zealand) this access to information is 
guaranteed by law.  
 
The majority of existing conditional embryo programmes incorporates some form of non-anonymity, 
as they promote both non-anonymous donation and facilitate contact between donors and recipients 
while the child is growing up. For instance, the guidance issued by Advisory Committee on Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (ACART) in New Zealand states that donors and recipients should 
negotiate ‘Each other’s needs, wishes, expectations, and plans regarding ongoing contact and 
information sharing.’19 This is different from the nonanonymous donation programmes that operate in 
the UK, for example, as access and information about the donor is only available when the child 
reaches majority. Conditional donation and non-anonymity do not have to go hand-in-hand, but in 
practice these programmes keep records and allow contact between the donors and recipients to be 
negotiated while the child is growing up. Thus, conditional embryo donation seeks to create a 
‘relational model’ of donation, whereby the donation heralds the forming of many new family 
relationships rather than a one-off event conducted in the clinic. Embryo adoption agencies operate a 
form of conditional embryo donation. The first embryo adoption programme, Snowflakes® Embryo 
Adoption, was launched in 1997 by Nightlight Christian Adoptions, a California based adoption 
agency.20 This is an example of the third model. Even if the relinquishing couple chooses not to know 
the identity of recipients and plans no contact with them, these programmes generally operate as 
nonanonymous systems and recommend that any child born should be able to learn the identity of her 
or his genetic parents (although in the US this is not legally enforceable). There are now at least seven 
agencies in the United States offering an embryo ‘adoption’ service.21 New Zealand’s conditional 
embryo donation programme is another example. Those wishing to donate embryos must apply to the 
Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology (ACART).22 In 2011-12 the Ethics 
Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology (ECART) reviewed 15 applications for embryo 
donation for reproductive purposes; 14 were approved and one approved subject to conditions. To 
date 14 live births have results from embryo donation applications approved by ECART.23 ACART 
requires relinquishing couples to be provided with a profile of the potential recipients that includes 
any police vetting information. Both relinquishing and recipient couples are required to have 
independent legal advice and counselling and any resulting child has access to identifying information 
when they reach majority. In sum, conditional embryo donation programmes allow those 
relinquishing their embryos to specifically select who receives their embryos and be actively involved 
in that process, rather than donating to a facility that then allocates the embryo. 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONDITIONAL DONATION 
 
The moral status of the embryo and conditional donation.  
 
One of the main criticisms of conditional embryo donation programmes has been made by the 
American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), in a report published in 2009, Defining embryo 
donation,24 that considered the ethical acceptability of an embryo adoption model of embryo 
relinquishment. In this the Committee argued that the ‘application of the term “adoption” to embryos 
is inaccurate [and] misleading’25 and concluded that ‘the donation of embryos for reproductive 
purposes is fundamentally a medical procedure intended to result in pregnancy and should be treated 
as such.’26 Seeing embryo relinquishment in this way provides a ‘framework for safe and ethical 
treatment of donors and patients requiring donated embryos for their treatment.’27 The report goes on 
to argue that ‘applying the procedural requirements of adoption designed to protect existing children 
to embryos is not ethically justifiable and has the potential for harm.’28 The Committee’s central 
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argument against embryo ‘adoption’ is that the embryo is not a person, although ‘Embryos are 
deserving of special respect, but they are not afforded the same status as persons.’29 Applying the 
language of adoption to embryo relinquishment is deceptive ‘because it reinforces a conceptualization 
of the embryo as a fully entitled legal being and thus leads to a series of procedures that are not 
appropriate.’30 This position has two parts: that this language reinforces a conceptualisation of the 
embryo as a person and second, it leads to a series of procedures that are inappropriate. The ASRM 
took exception to the language of embryo ‘adoption’ and this is not an argument against the practice 
of conditional embryo donation itself, but the terminology used to describe it. The concern of ASRM 
and others is that endorsement of embryo adoption supports a view of the embryo (and fetus) as 
having full moral status. The risk here is of becoming embroiled in American abortion politics, the 
potential impact on women’s rights to choose, and the wider implications for the provision of fertility 
treatment that affording the embryo full moral status might have. Recent developments in the US such 
as the personhood bills in Oklahoma and Virginia and embryo adoption legislation in Georgia show 
that these concerns are warranted.31 Therefore, we would argue that the language of ‘adoption’ can be 
polarizing and should be used cautiously in this context. The second point, that it leads to a ‘set of 
procedures’ that are not appropriate, is a more important issue as it strikes at the heart of conditional 
embryo donation, that these procedures of donors specifically selecting recipients of their embryo are 
unwarranted. In this article we are concerned whether the argument can be upheld that if the embryo 
is not a person (in the morally relevant sense), the use of such conditional donation procedures is 
unwarranted. 
 
There are two parts to the ‘not-a-person-argument’ against having conditional procedures (specifically 
selecting to whom one donates one’s embryo) applied to embryo donation: first, the embryo is not a 
person, it does not have the same moral status as an existing child (or indeed adult);32 second, and 
consequent on this, the procedures envisaged under a conditional model of embryo donation are 
inappropriate; procedures applied to the adoption of a child are designed to protect the child and the 
embryo, not having moral status, does not need to be protected in this way. In this article we will not 
seek to defend the view that the embryo is not a person and therefore does not have moral status but 
accept this position without argument (this is a topic that has been extensively debated in medical 
ethics).33 For our purposes the key debate is about the implications of the lack of moral status of the 
embryo for the procedures involved in conditionally donating embryos to others for family building. 
We will consider two key objections to the claim that, as the embryo does not have moral status, 
conditional donation procedures are unwarranted. First, we argue that although the embryo does not 
have moral status, it may still have interests in its future – interests that are held by the person it might 
become – and these might be furthered by some of the procedures that are currently employed by 
conditional embryo donation procedures. Second, leaving this aside, these procedures could be 
justified on the grounds that, regardless of any interest 
 
The future interests of the embryo 
 
Moral status does not need to be given to the embryo to justify a form of embryo donation that 
employs the type of conditional procedures that have been discussed above. There are several 
plausible arguments that suggest that there are reasons for treating the embryo in a certain way, not 
based on the moral status it has now, but on the moral status it will have in the future. McMahan34 
puts forward an argument of this type. He argues that it is morally more reprehensible to harm a fetus 
prenatally (and we hold that his arguments apply to 
embryos as well) than to abort it. His arguments in support of this can be used to advance the claim 
that embryos can have an interest in their future lives (this does not give them a right not to be 
destroyed or used for research) and (if they are given an opportunity to develop into fetuses and then 
children) these interests might be furthered by being donated in a particular way when they are an 
embryo. There are two parts to the argument about future interests. First, the claim that the embryo 
can have future interests that will become manifest when it becomes a person, and that although the 
embryo’s current interests are weak (i.e. it has a weak interest in staying alive), actions that damage 
the embryo’s future interests (in McMahan’s example prenatal injury) will damage interests held by 
the person the embryo will become. Second, if this view of future interests is accepted, does the 
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application of conditional procedures ensure safeguards or promote the future interests of the person 
the embryo will become? McMahan’s argument proceeds by outlining assumptions about the fetus 
and future interests that he says are generally held. One such assumption, that he argues is held by 
most moral beliefs, is that we accept that current actions should be constrained by ‘respect for future 
interests – that is, interests that do not exist now, and indeed whose bearers may not exist now, but 
that will exist in the future.’35 He argues that we have a belief that it would be wrong to plant a bomb 
programmed to detonate in 150 years’ time that could harm the interests of people who do not exist 
now. The fetus’s current interests are weak, so it is not wrong to frustrate these current interests. But it 
is wrong to inflict some kind of prenatal injury on the fetus that will harm future interests it might 
have. This is because if the fetus has such an injury inflicted and comes to be born, this injury will 
frustrate (to use McMahan’s terminology) the many future interests this person will have throughout 
their life. ‘Prenatal injury frustrates future interests, which may be the interests of a person and also 
quite strong.’36 As Kamm puts it, ‘any duties we have to treat a fetus in a certain way exist only 
because of the person it will develop into.’37 The assumption that we have obligations to others’ future 
interests in the way suggested by McMahan has an intuitive appeal. In applying the idea of future 
interests to the case of embryo donation, we need to establish that not being donated through 
conditional procedures is a harm to the embryo (a kind of prenatal injury) and therefore these 
procedures safeguard some future interests the embryo – when it becomes a person – might have. 
Such interests might be being brought up in a loving and supportive home and arguably being able to 
have information and possible contact with those who donated them and other genetic relatives, such 
as full genetic brothers or sisters. Therefore, just as we should act in those interests when the embryo 
becomes a person, we should act to further them for the future. Studies have found that one of the 
reasons why some couples choose to relinquish through an embryo adoption agency was that they felt 
they were acting in a way that promoted the future interests of the person their embryo would become. 
Issues that were important to those who relinquished their embryos in this way were: the suitability of 
recipients, future contact and information exchange between them and the recipients and creating 
future relationships and contact between their children and the child the embryo would become, who 
would be full genetic siblings.38 These concerns can be seen as an expression of the view that even 
though the embryo has no current interests, the interests it will have when it becomes a person are 
important. Research in this area is still limited and even if we accept McMahan’s claims about 
embryos’ future interests, there is no guarantee that conditional procedures promote such interests. It 
is by no means self-evident that embryo donation employing conditional procedures, as opposed to 
non-conditional donation, confers any benefit to the future child, as there is little evidence about the 
outcomes of any form of embryo donation. As regards evidence of psycho-social outcomes of embryo 
donation, to date only two empirical studies involving families built using donated embryos have been 
reported, undertaken in Finland39 and the UK.40 Given the paucity of good quality evidence 
concerning the experiences of family building following embryo donation, it is possible only to 
speculate about the potential psycho-social implications for those most closely involved, especially 
when the children conceived following embryo donation become older. Thus, pending more 
systematic research of both physical/medical and psycho-social outcomes, the implications of embryo 
donation using conditional procedures remain largely unknown. However, it has been argued that a 
relational model of donation is to be preferred41 and therefore on these grounds conditional donation, 
in supporting such a model, confers benefits to those involved.  
 
The interests of relinquishers, their children and recipients 
 
We now want to consider the second argument against the contention that, since the embryo is not a 
person, conditional procedures are unwarranted. These procedures can operate in the interests of those 
with embryos to donate, their children, and recipients of those embryos, rather than in the interests of 
the embryo. These procedures do not have to be premised on the moral status of the embryo or any 
interests it might have in the future (it can be accepted for the sake of this argument that the embryo 
has no interests),42 but on how the two adult parties want to organize the transfer of the embryo. 
Certain procedures, like the ability of the relinquishing couple to choose who receives their embryos 
and the ability to negotiate (possibly) giving contact and information both while the child is growing 
up and when (s)he reaches majority, are elements that are attractive to some individuals. Conditional 
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procedures can be justified without any recourse to claiming that the embryo has any moral status, 
interest in the future or rights – it can be seen as the choice of some individuals and couples as to how 
they wish to relinquish their embryos. This could be argued for on grounds of reproductive choice: 
people should be able to exercise this choice unless it can be argued that this causes harm to others.43 
It could also be argued that conditional embryo donation serves the interests of the children whose 
parents donate their embryos for family-building better than an anonymous donation model. The 
embryos donated, if they result in the birth of a child, would be the full genetic siblings of children in 
the donors’ family, who could have a strong desire to meet or have information about their siblings. 
There is increasing evidence that at least some individuals conceived following third party assisted 
conception have a desire to learn the identity of their genetic relatives, including genetic half-
siblings.44 Although there is no comparable evidence regarding the interests that children of donors 
might have in learning the identity of their half-siblings – in the case of sperm of egg donation - or 
full siblings - in the case of embryo adoption, there is no reason to assume that at least some will not 
also wish to learn about their genetic relatives, and this is a consideration taken into account by some 
couples who relinquish embryos through an embryo adoption agency.45 In this section we have argued 
that embryo donation using conditional procedures does not have to be premised on embryos having 
full moral status. It can be based on the embryo having future interests that could be met by this 
conditional donation model. But, even if this account of the embryo’s future interests is rejected, the 
procedures can be justified on the grounds of operating in the interests of donors and the resultant 
families. 
 
MORALLY PROBLEMATIC CONDITIONS 
 
A possible difficulty with conditional donation is that donors might make the choice of who receives 
their embryo on grounds that could be thought of as immoral. For instance, conditions might be 
specified that seemed to reflect some prejudice, such as racism or homophobia. The issue is brought 
into relief in the UK by fertility clinics having to abide by the Equality Act 2010. This stipulates that 
protected characteristics (such as sex, sexual orientation and disability) cannot be grounds for 
differential treatment. The Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority has considered how the 
Equality Act might affect conditional donation (of both gametes and embryos) and the latest guidance 
in the Code of Practice states that it is acceptable for donors to put conditions on the use of their eggs, 
sperm and embryos but: ‘When deciding whether or not to recruit donors who place conditions on the 
use of their gametes or embryos, the centre should judge whether this will result in less favourable 
treatment because of a protected characteristic (i.e. if it will reduce the choice of donors for a 
particular person by virtue of a protected characteristic).’46 So is conditional donation discriminatory 
morally and/or legally? As stated above, we have drawn a distinction between ‘specific selection’ (the 
type of conditional donation under discussion here) and ‘blanket conditions’ and therefore we need to 
consider each type separately to answer this question. Blanket conditions do seem to be 
discriminatory (morally at least). This issue was raised in organ transplantation in 1998 when a white 
man consented to donation of his organs to white recipients only – this can be seen as a blanket 
condition.47 The ensuing outcry resulted in recommendations that it was unethical to place conditions 
on who could receive one’s organs after death. However, the current situation with organ transplants 
is that conditions can be put on organs donated when the donor is alive,48 so that someone can donate 
a kidney to a person of their choice, rather than it being distributed according to those in the wider 
population who have a greater clinical need – a form of ‘specific selection’. Thus, choosing a 
particular recipient for a donated organ appears not to be discriminatory, but stipulating that it cannot 
be donated to anyone in a particular racial group does. 
 
In terms of blanket conditions for embryos, clinics that were asked to ensure that no one from a 
particular group received the embryo might feel that by accepting conditions that, to their mind, were 
a result of prejudice, they would in some way be endorsing these views and decide not to operate their 
programme in this way due to their ethical views. Legally, as clinics are public bodies offering a 
public service, they have to abide by the Equality Act and it could be argued that by accepting the 
donor’s conditions, they would fall foul of the Act. However, the key issue is whether the protected 
group is disadvantaged and it is possible to speculate that not allowing conditions to be placed on 
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potential embryo recipients could discourage certain people from donating and therefore reduce the 
supply of donated embryos. For example, an embryo donated with the condition that it only went to a 
married (and currently therefore a heterosexual couple) could result in the freeing up other embryos 
(which had no such conditions) that could be used by a lesbian couple. Hence, the protected group (in 
this case lesbian couples) would not be disadvantaged – and by the supply of embryos increasing they 
would actually be advantaged. The Equality Act also stipulates that if unequal treatment is 
‘proportionate’ with achieving a legitimate aim this is acceptable.49 The legitimate aim might be 
argued to be increasing the number of embryos available for donation and therefore allowing 
conditions in this way could be seen as ‘proportionate’.50 For the case of ‘specific selection’, it could 
be argued that those donating embryos are in a different position from clinics (since they are not 
bodies providing a service) and they could withdraw their consent for the donation if they felt no 
suitable recipient could be found. Their definition of ‘not suitable’ might be discriminatory or bizarre 
and it would be hard to have any redress against this. Donors are not under any obligation to provide 
reasons for withdrawing consent for their donation. This would seem to be a private decision of how 
to dispose of one’s own property. For example, if someone was to sell their house and a member of 
group x puts in a good offer for it that is refused (on the grounds that the seller is prejudiced against 
members of group x and don’t want to sell their house to them), the seller is not accountable to 
anyone for that decision or compelled to justify why they have sold their house to someone from 
group y and not someone from group x. This decision is based on prejudice and the person from group 
x is being discriminated against, but no one would be aware of this. This is not to say that those 
making specific choices regarding to whom they donate their embryo are always discriminating or 
that such covert discrimination is right, just that it would be impossible to tell if they were 
discriminating against certain groups. In other areas of life we allow people to choose to whom to sell 
things, who they have as friends and form relationships with. Conditional embryo donation should be 
no different. As in these other areas of life, we seek to discourage discrimination by education and this 
could be done in this area by clinics counselling people with embryos to encourage choices that are 
not made on the basis of arbitrary characteristics. 
 
PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS TO CONDITIONAL RELINQUISHMENT 
 
There are a number of practical objections that can be made to conditional donation. The ASRM 
argues that conditional donation along the lines of an embryo ‘adoption’ model would impose 
‘unwarranted burdens’ on infertility patients, such as home visits, judicial review, legal and 
‘substantial’ agency fees that are not ‘ethically justifiable.’51 This is a fear that the complex and 
arduous processes involved in adopting an existing child would be applied to embryos under a 
conditional programme. This type of criticism presupposes a particular model of conditional donation. 
Judicial review in the sense of court-directed transfer of parental responsibility from relinquishing to 
recipient parents does not play any part in the current programmes of conditional donation. As noted 
above, the legal framework for the adoption of existing children is not applicable to an embryo 
(except in a limited number of jurisdictions). Conditional donation could operate in a variety of ways 
and does not have to be directly analogous to adoption procedures for existing children. It could 
encompass varying degrees of involvement in choosing recipients by those donating embryos (from 
choosing recipients on the basis of detailed profiles to allowing the agency or clinic to select 
recipients); differing levels of contact arrangements between the donors and recipients once the child 
is born (from face-to-face contact, to email updates, exchange of photographs/ information, to no 
contact until the child is an adult). Any objection to conditional donation based on criticisms of an 
onerous procedure is a challenge to one form of conditional donation. In any event, any individual 
contemplating family building by means of embryo donation who found these procedures excessively 
burdensome would be under no pressure to choose this route, and if insufficient takers existed for this 
type of service it would soon cease to be viable. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have argued that the objections to conditional donation that we have considered can be countered. 
So what implications does the above discussion have for the debate over how embryos should be 
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donated? As we have argued, we do not think there is compelling evidence to prioritize one approach 
over another in this context. There is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the welfare of the child 
the embryo will become is better safeguarded by being relinquished through a conditional donation 
programme – that the parents chosen make ‘better’ parents or the screening ensures a higher degree of 
welfare. However, conditional donation programmes generally promote open and non-anonymous 
donation and this has been argued to better meet the needs of those born from the process to find out 
information about the family who relinquished them and encourage a more ‘relational’ model of 
donation.52 Conditional embryo donation options should be available, as well as the option of 
allowing the clinic to allocate the embryo with no intervention from the donors, to maximize 
acceptable options for those with unused embryos. 
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